CVE-2026-64109

Status: UPDATED  |  Advisory ID: CVE-2026-64109

Key Details

Affected Products, Subsystems & Sectors

What to Know

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait()

unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without

holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and

freed.

This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix

peeking with an offset larger than data in queue").

The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison

`tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an

already-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address;

which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new

data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and

a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a

real problem.

But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream

af_unix sockets"), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in

the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded,

and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in

two threads:

```

static int socks[2];

void test_setup(void) {

socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);

send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0);

int peekoff = 1;

setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff));

}

void test_thread1(void) {

char dummy;

recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK);

}

void test_thread2(void) {

char dummy;

recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0);

shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR);

}

```

when racing like this:

```

thread1 thread2

unix_stream_read_generic

mutex_lock(&u->iolock)

skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)

skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)

mutex_unlock(&u->iolock)

unix_stream_read_generic

unix_state_lock(sk)

skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)

unix_state_unlock(sk)

unix_stream_data_wait

unix_state_lock(sk)

tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue)

spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)

__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)

spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)

consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB]

`tail != last`: false

`tail`: true

`tail->len != last_len` ***UAF***

```

Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would

only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow,

which can no longer happen.

Kuniyuki explained:

> When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage

> support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last

> skb in the receiver's queue.

>

> That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed

> while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait().

>

> However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and

> commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use

> MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added

> to a new skb.

That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5. (NVD)

What to Do

Monitor Linux's web page for any future patch releases.

References