Linux Kernel KVM hypervisor Integer Overflow Rated 7.0 CVSS

Status: UPDATED  |  Advisory ID: CVE-2026-64283

Key Details

Affected Products, Subsystems & Sectors

What to Know

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: guest_memfd: Treat memslot binding offset+size as unsigned values

When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, treat the offset and size as

unsigned values to fix a bug where the sum of the two can result in a false

negative when checking for overflow against the size of the file. Passing

unsigned values also avoids relying on somewhat obscure checks in other

flows for safety, and tracks the offset and size as they are intended to be

tracked, as unsigned values.

On 64-bit kernels, the number of pages a memslot contains and thus the size

(and offset) of its guest_memfd binding are unsigned 64-bit values. Taking

the offset+size as an loff_t instead of a uoff_t inadvertently converts

the unsigned value to a signed value if the offset and/or size is massive.

Locally storing the offset and size as signed values is benign in and of

itself (though even that is *extremely* difficult to discern), but

operating on their sum is not.

For the offset, KVM explicitly checks against a negative value, which might

seem like a bug as KVM could incorrectly reject a legitimate binding, but

that's not actually the case as KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD takes a signed value

for its size, i.e. a would-be-negative offset is also greater than the

maximum possible size of any guest_memfd file.

Regarding the size, while KVM lacks an explicit check for a negative value,

i.e. seemingly has a flawed overflow check, KVM restricts the number of

pages in a single memslot to the largest positive signed 32-bit value:

if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS &&

(mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)

return -EINVAL;

and so that maximum "size" will ever be is 0x7fffffff000.

The sum of the two is, however, problematic. While the size is restricted

by KVM's memslot logic, the offset is not, i.e. the offset is completely

unchecked until the "offset + size > i_size_read(inode)" check. If the

offset is the (nearly) largest possible _positive_ value, then adding size

to the offset can result in a signed, negative 64-bit value. When compared

against the size of the file (guaranteed to be positive), the negative sum

is always smaller, and KVM incorrectly allows the absurd offset.

Opportunistically add missing includes in kvm_mm.h (instead of relying on

its parents). (NVD)

What to Do

Monitor Linux's web page for any future patch releases.

References