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Python cryptography Package PKCS#7 Decrypt Functions Report Distinguishable RSA Padding Outcomes, Exposing a Bleichenbacher Oracle Against the Content-Encryption Key

Last refreshed2026-09-29

Status: NEW  |  Advisory ID: CVE-2026-69247

Key Details

CVECVE-2026-69247
CVSS Score / Version8.2 (High) / CVSS v4.0
Updated2026-09-10
Classified asCWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)

What to Know

cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. From 44.0.0 until 50.0.0, pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key. Decryption ran as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey, build an AES cipher from the result, then AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Invalid RSA padding, a valid padding with a bad key length, a correct length with a wrong key, and the real key each failed or succeeded differently. Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter. This issue is fixed in 50.0.0. (NVD)

References

SourceReference
NVDhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247
CVEhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-69247