Status: UPDATED | Advisory ID: CVE-2026-72367
| CVE | CVE-2026-72367 |
| CVSS Score / Version | |
| Updated | 2026-10-21 |
| CVSS Vector | |
| CVSS Prose | |
| Affected products |
| Vendor | Product | Affected Versions | Patch Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux Kernel |
| Subsystems | OT Supporting Infrastructure |
| Sectors | All Sectors |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow
iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes
changed ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data
within EOF. This trims io_size when a writeback range extends
past end_pos:
ioend->io_size += map_len;
if (ioend->io_offset + ioend->io_size > end_pos)
ioend->io_size = end_pos - ioend->io_offset;
However, if end_pos ends up below ioend->io_offset, the subtraction
becomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned
wrap to a huge value. This can happen when writeback continues past
byte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent
truncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in
iomap_writeback_handle_eof().
A wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt
completion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume
io_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW
completion ranges.
Fix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before
the ioend start offset. This preserves the original intent of trimming
io_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow. (NVD)
Monitor Linux's web page for any future patch releases.
| Source | Reference |
|---|---|
| NVD | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72367 |
| CVE | https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72367 |