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CVE-2026-90414

Last refreshed2026-10-19

Status: UPDATED  |  Advisory ID: CVE-2026-90414

Key Details

CVECVE-2026-90414
CVSS Score / Version
9.1 (Critical) / CVSS v3.1
Updated2026-10-19
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
CVSS Prose
attack vector is network; attack complexity is low; privileges required is none; user interaction is none; scope is unchanged; confidentiality impact is high; integrity impact is none; availability impact is high.
Affected products
Linux Kernel

Affected Products, Subsystems & Sectors

VendorProductAffected VersionsPatch Status
LinuxLinux Kernel
SubsystemsOT Supporting Infrastructure
SectorsAll Sectors

What to Know

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received

isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without

ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed

in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the

data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS

(ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -

out of the fixed-size descriptor:

isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():

sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),

unsol_data_len);

isert_handle_scsi_cmd():

sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,

isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);

Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an

initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually

sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of

the receive buffer.

Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:

- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against

conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,

used here for the inbound check.

- iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets

ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;

and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in

iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is

adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively

raises its own ceiling.

- isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive

descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and

the descriptor size are unrelated.

The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases

the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as

the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap

contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the

backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist

isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was

demonstrated.

Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has

declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that

permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment

length exceeds what was received. With KASAN:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0

Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25

Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work

Call Trace:

sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0

isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390

__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390

ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150

isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout()

(ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode().

Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the

PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short.

Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also

rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise

be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs

shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login

PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared

length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no

length check at all.

isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data()

returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for

an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly

[ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum

against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS

term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth

---truncated--- (NVD)

What to Do

Monitor Linux's web page for any future patch releases.

References

SourceReference
NVDhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90414
CVEhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90414
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